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Abstract
Hedonic games provide a natural model of coali-
tion formation among self-interested agents. The
associated problem of finding stable outcomes in
such games has been extensively studied. In this
paper, we identify simple conditions on expressivity
of hedonic games that are sufficient for the problem
of checking whether a given game admits a stable
outcome to be computationally hard. Somewhat
surprisingly, these conditions are very mild and in-
tuitive. Our results apply to a wide range of stability
concepts (core stability, individual stability, Nash
stability, etc.) and to many known formalisms for
hedonic games (additively separable games, games
withW-preferences, fractional hedonic games, etc.),
and unify and extend known results for these for-
malisms. They also have broader applicability: for
several classes of hedonic games whose computa-
tional complexity has not been explored in prior
work, we show that our framework immediately im-
plies a number of hardness results for them.
1 Introduction
Hedonic games [Dre`ze and Greenberg, 1980; Banerjee et al.,
2001; Bogomolnaia and Jackson, 2002] provide an elegant
and versatile model of coalition formation among strategic
agents. In such games, each agent has preferences over coali-
tions (subsets of players) that she can be a part of, and an
outcome of the game is a partition of agents into coalitions.
Clearly, the quality of an outcome depends on how well it
reflects the agents’ preferences. In particular, it is desirable to
have outcomes that are stable, i.e., do not offer the agents an
opportunity to profitably deviate. Many different concepts of
stability have been proposed in the hedonic games literature
(see Section 2 for a brief summary, and [Aziz and Savani,
2015] for an in-depth discussion), and for each of them a natu-
ral computational question is whether a given game admits an
outcome that is stable in that sense.
The complexity of this question depends on how the game
is represented: while every hedonic game can be described
∗Presented at IJCAI 2015, Buenos Aires. This version includes
full proofs in the appendix.
SNS SCR CR NS IS
IRCL of length 6 3 NP-h. NP-c. NP-c. NP-c.
IRCL of length 6 9 NP-h. NP-c. NP-c. NP-c. NP-c.
Hedonic Coalition Nets NP-h. NP-h. NP-h. NP-c. NP-c.
Stable Marriages (SMI) (P) NP-c. (P)
W-preferences (no ties) (P) (P) NP-c. NP-c.
W-preferences NP-h. NP-c. NP-c. NP-c.
WB-preferences (no ties) (P) (P) NP-c. NP-c.
WB-preferences NP-h. NP-c. NP-c. NP-c.
B- & W-hedonic games NP-h. NP-h. NP-c. NP-c.
Additively separable NP-h. NP-h. NP-h. NP-c. NP-c.
Fractional hedonic games NP-h. NP-h. NP-h. NP-c. NP-c.
Social FHGs NP-h. NP-h. (+) (+)
Median NP-h. NP-h.
Midrange ( 12B+ 12W) NP-h. NP-h. NP-c. NP-c.
3-Approval NP-h. NP-h. NP-c. NP-c.
4-Approval NP-h. NP-h. NP-h. NP-c. NP-c.
Table 1: Some of the hardness results implied by our framework
for the problem of identifying hedonic games with stable outcomes.
Gray entries are results that have not appeared in the literature before.
(P) indicates known polynomial-time algorithms, (+) means that a
stable outcome always exists. See Section 6 for details.
by explicitly listing each agent’s preference relation over all
coalitions that may contain her, in recent years there has been
a considerable amount of research on succinct representation
formalisms for hedonic games, i.e., ones where a game de-
scription size scales polynomially with the number of agents n.
Typically, such formalisms are not universally expressive, but
capture important classes of hedonic games. For instance, if
the utility that an agent assigns to a coalition is given by the
sum/average/minimum/maximum of the utilities she assigns to
individual members of that coalition, the entire game can be de-
scribed by n(n−1) numbers (such games are known as, respec-
tively, additively separable games [Bogomolnaia and Jackson,
2002], fractional hedonic games [Aziz et al., 2014], and games
withW- and B-preferences [Cechla´rova´ and Hajdukova´, 2003;
Cechla´rova´ and Hajdukova´, 2004b]). There are also represen-
tation formalisms that are universally expressive (and hence
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exponentially verbose in the worst case), but provide succinct
descriptions of hedonic games that have certain structural
properties; examples include Individually Rational Coalition
Lists [Ballester, 2004] and Hedonic Coalition Nets [Elkind and
Wooldridge, 2009]. The complexity of stability-related prob-
lems under these and other representations for hedonic games
has been investigated by a number of researchers (see [Woeg-
inger, 2013a] for a survey); with a few exceptions, checking
whether a game admits a stable outcome turns out to be com-
putationally hard.
In this paper, we unify and extend several known hardness
results for this family of problems in order to uncover common
causes of complexity of stability-related questions in hedo-
nic games. In their simplest form, our results imply that if
in a given representation formalism, agents are able to rank
coalitions of size two in any way they wish, and if agents are
to some extent averse to the presence of enemies, then the
problem of checking whether a game admits a stable outcome
is NP-hard. The precise meaning of being averse to enemies
depends on the stability concept in question. We also introduce
intuitively appealing conditions on how agents rank coalitions
of size three, which turn out to entail NP-hardness even if the
underlying preferences are strict. Our approach enables us to
automatically derive new hardness results for hedonic games:
instead of coming up with a hardness reduction, one can sim-
ply check whether the representation in question satisfies the
relevant conditions on enemy-aversion and coalitions of size
two or three. By doing so, we answer several questions that
were left open by prior work, and substantially contribute to
the understanding of computational complexity of somewhat
less explored solution concepts: to the best of our knowledge,
we are the first to obtain NP-hardness results for strong Nash
stability (SNS), strict strong Nash stability (SSNS), and strong
individual stability (SIS).
To provide further evidence of the power of our approach,
we also consider several classes of hedonic games whose
complexity has not been investigated before, and derive NP-
hardness results for them using our methodology. Perhaps
the most interesting of them is the class of median games,
proposed by [Hajdukova´, 2006], where each agent assigns a
utility to every other agent, and her utility for a coalition is the
utility she assigns to the median agent in that coalition.
The complexity results implied by our analysis are sum-
marized in Table 1. However, we believe that the sufficient
conditions for hardness identified in our work are at least as im-
portant as the specific new results we have established. Indeed,
these conditions indicate which additional constraints should
be placed on a representation formalism to avoid the com-
plexity trap, and may guide researchers towards identifying
formalisms that adequately describe their application scenario,
yet admit efficient algorithms for finding stable outcomes.
2 Preliminaries
Given a finite set of agents N = {1, . . . ,n}, a hedonic game is
a pair G= 〈N,(<i)i∈N〉, where <i is a complete and transitive
preference relation overNi = {S⊆N : i∈ S}. We write Si T
when S <i T , but T 6<i S. A class C of hedonic games is
any collection of hedonic games. We say that a class C is
polynomially representable if there exists a polynomial p(x)
and a poly-time algorithm A such that each 〈N,(<i)i∈N〉 ∈
C can be represented by a binary string of length at most
p(|N|), and, given this string, an agent i ∈ N, and a pair of
coalitions S,T ∈Ni, algorithm A can decide whether S<i T .
For example, additively separable hedonic games mentioned
in Section 1 form a polynomially representable class.
An outcome of a hedonic game is a partition pi of N into
disjoint coalitions. We write pi(i) for the coalition of pi that
contains i. For partitions pi and pi′, we write pi <i pi′ to mean
pi(i)<i pi′(i).
We are mainly interested in the stability of a given partition
pi of N. We will consider seven stability concepts for hedo-
nic games: two that are based on individual deviations, and
five that are based on group deviations. The former group
comprises Nash stability (NS) and individual stability (IS). A
partition pi is NS if no player can benefit from moving to an-
other (possibly empty) coalition S in pi, i.e., pi(i)<i S∪{i} for
all S ∈ pi∪{∅}. Partition pi satisfies IS if no player can make
such a beneficial move without making an agent in S worse
off, i.e., for each S ∈ pi∪{∅} it holds that pi(i)<i S∪{i} or
S j S∪{i} for some j ∈ S.
The classic solution concept for group deviations is the
core (CR). We say that a non-empty coalition S CR-blocks pi
if S i pi(i) for all i ∈ S; it SCR-blocks pi if S <i pi(i) for all
i ∈ S and, moreover, Si pi(i) for some i ∈ S. If no coalition
CR-blocks pi, it is in the core (CR); if no coalition SCR-blocks
it, it is in the strict core (SCR).
SSNS
SNS
NS SIS
SCR
IS
IR
CR
Karakaya [2011] introduced strong
Nash stability (SNS), and Aziz and
Brandl [2012] introduced the derived
notions of strict strong Nash stability
(SSNS) and strong individual stability
(SIS). These solution concepts deal
with deviations where the deviators do
not necessarily form a single coalition.
Given two partitions pi, pi′, we say that a
coalition H ⊆N can reach pi′ from pi if for all i, j 6∈H we have
pi(i) = pi( j) if and only if pi′(i) = pi′( j). Coalition H SSNS-
blocks pi if it can reach some pi′ with pi′ <i pi for all i ∈ H and
pi′ i pi for some i ∈ H. If H can reach some pi′ with pi′ i pi
for all i ∈H then H is said to SNS-block pi. If H SNS-blocks pi
by reaching pi′ and, moreover, for each i∈H and each j ∈ pi′(i)
we have pi′ < j pi, then H is said to SIS-block pi. A partition
pi is α-stable (where α ∈ {SSNS, SNS, SIS}) if no coalition
α-blocks it. Intuitively, SNS-blocking coalitions allow groups
of agents to swap places with each other. For SIS-blocking
coalitions, agents joined by a deviator must consent to the
changes.
The diagram above shows implication relationships among
these concepts. A partition that is SSNS-stable is also stable un-
der every other solution concept considered here. A coalition
S 3 i is individually rational (IR) for i if S<i {i}. A partition
pi is said to be IR if pi(i) is IR for all i ∈ N.
3 Properties of Preferences
Our hardness results require a given class C of hedonic games
to be expressive enough to include hard instances. To this end,
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agents should have some freedom in how they order small
coalitions. Our results apply to formalisms that enable each
agent i to express arbitrary preferences over coalitions of the
form {i, j}, as well as satisfy a few other constraints. Thus,
in a sense, our results are about the hardness of finding stable
outcomes in hedonic games obtained by lifting preferences
over individual players to preferences over coalitions.
We associate each agent i∈N with a complete and transitive
order >i over N. We interpret >i as i’s preference order over
the set of players. We write j >i k if j >i k but not k >i j,
and we write j ∼i k if both j >i k and k >i j. We call Fi =
{ j 6= i : j >i i} and Ei = { j 6= i : j <i i} the friends and the
enemies of i. In what follows, it will not matter how >i orders
Ei—only its restriction on Fi will be of interest.
We now describe a series of properties that relate i’s prefer-
ences <i over the coalitions in Ni to her preferences >i over
the agents in N. These properties express various ways in
which<i can be said to extend >i. The numerical examples in
brackets aim to illustrate the intuition behind these properties.
Consistent on pairs. For all j,k ∈ Fi∪{i} it holds that {i, j}<i
{i,k} iff j >i k.
Monotone on triangles (‘7+6 > 7+5’). If j, j′,k,k′ ∈ Fi are
such that j >i j′ >i k >i k′, then {i, j,k} i {i, j′,k′}.
Triangle-appreciating (‘7+5> 7’). Two almost equally good
friends together are preferable to the better friend alone: If
j,k, ` ∈ Fi are ranked j >i k >i ` and they are immediate
successors under >i, then {i, j, `} i {i, j}.
Only few polynomial-time algorithms for finding stable
outcomes in hedonic games are known, mainly confined to
matching problems and the (structurally similar)W-hedonic
games. Notably these classes of games fail to be triangle-
appreciating, and in view of our results in Section 4 this is a
key reason why they admit easiness results.
The following properties express that agents do not like
coalitions that contain too many enemies.
{a-b}-toxic. If |S∩Fi|= a, but |S∩Ei|> b then {i}<i S.
Strictly {a-b}-toxic. Same as above with {i} i S.
Weakly {a-b}-toxic. Same as above with {i, j} i S for all
j ∈ Fi.
Intolerant in triangles. If E ′i ⊆ Ei is non-empty and j,k ∈ Fi
are distinct then {i, j,k} i {i, j,k}∪E ′i .
We write ‘(strictly/weakly) {a1-b1, . . . ,am-bm}-toxic’ for pref-
erences that are (strictly/weakly) {at -bt}-toxic for t = 1, . . . ,m.
Given a collection (>i)i∈N of orderings, we say that a he-
donic game 〈N,(<i)i∈N〉 satisfies one of the properties above
if each <i satisfies it with respect to >i. We say that the col-
lection is strict if each >i is antisymmetric, so j 6= k implies
j 6∼i k. The collection is mutual if j ∈Fi if and only if i∈Fj for
all i, j. For a mutual collection of orderings, we may consider
the friendship graph with vertex set N, where an (unweighted)
edge connects mutual friends. We will use standard terminol-
ogy of graph theory when talking about hedonic games, and,
in particular, speak of cliques, trees, and cycles of agents.
4 Hardness Results
Let C be a polynomially representable class of hedonic games.
For every stability concept α defined in Section 2, we will
consider the following decision problem associated with C.
α-EXISTENCE FOR C
Instance: Game 〈N,(<i)i∈N〉 from C in its binary encoding.
Question: Is there an α-stable partition pi of N?
To avoid difficulties with binary representations that are very
short, we will assume that the binary encoding of 〈N,(<i)i∈N〉
lists the names of agents in N, and hence contains at least |N|
bits. Furthermore, when in the following theorems we assume
that C contains various hedonic games 〈N,(<i)i∈N〉 derived
from orderings (>i)i∈N , we require that such games (i.e., their
binary descriptions) can be constructed in time polynomial
in |N|; this property is necessary for our hardness reductions
to work in polynomial time and is satisfied by all classes of
hedonic games considered in this paper.
Our first result has mild assumptions and applies to a large
number of classes C.
Theorem 1. CR-EXISTENCE FOR C is NP-hard if for all N and
every mutual collection of orderings (>i)i∈N in which each
agent has at most 3 friends, there is a game 〈N,(<i)i∈N〉 ∈ C
that is consistent on pairs, {0-1}-toxic and weakly {1-1,2-2}-
toxic with respect to (>i)i∈N .
REMARK I. Under the same set of conditions SIS-EXISTENCE
FOR C is also NP-hard; we obtain a hardness result for SNS-
EXISTENCE FOR C by strengthening weak {1-1}-toxicity to
{1-1}-toxicity.
Effectively, Theorem 1 says that if agents are allowed to
rank pairs as they wish, and if they do not have to like everyone,
then finding a core-stable outcome is hard.
The assumptions are chosen so as to guarantee
that a game like the pentagon displayed on the
right has empty core. In this game, each agent
has exactly two friends, the clockwise successor
being preferred to the clockwise predecessor. All
other agents are enemies. It can be checked that if agents’
preferences satisfy weak {1-1,2-2}-toxicity then this game
has empty core. We use the 9-player version of this game as a
gadget in our hardness reductions (see Figure 1).
A similar result holds for solution concepts based on indi-
vidual deviations.
Theorem 2. NS- and IS-EXISTENCE FOR C are NP-complete
if for all N and every strict and mutual collection of orderings
(>i)i∈N in which each agent has at most 3 friends, there is a
game 〈N,(<i)i∈N〉 ∈ C that is consistent on pairs and strictly
{0-1,1-1,2-5}-toxic with respect to (>i)i∈N .
In the case of NS-EXISTENCE, the theorem remains true
even if the orderings (>i)i∈N are strict and bipartite (but not
mutual), i.e. the friendship graph is bipartite. Thus, its con-
clusion also applies to NS-EXISTENCE for the stable marriage
problem with unacceptabilities. For the case with ties allowed,
this result is also obtained by Aziz [2013].
The reduction establishing Theorem 1 makes essential use
of indifferences in the underlying orderings (>i)i∈N (this is
also the reason why it does not go through for the strict core).
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To cut off this cause of hardness, we need to make use of
conditions on triangles.
Theorem 3. CR- and SCR-EXISTENCE FOR C are NP-hard if
for all N and every collection of strict and mutual orderings
(>i)i∈N in which each agent has at most 4 friends, there is a
game 〈N,(<i)i∈N〉 ∈ C that is consistent on pairs, triangle-
appreciating, monotone on triangles, {0-1}-toxic, weakly
{1-1,2-2,3-3}-toxic, and intolerant in triangles with respect
to (>i)i∈N .
REMARK II. The same result holds for SIS-EXISTENCE FOR C.
It applies to SNS-EXISTENCE FOR C if we add {1-1}-toxicity
and weak {2-1}-toxicity. It applies to SSNS-EXISTENCE FOR C
if we add strict {0-1,1-1}-toxicity and weak {2-1}-toxicity.
5 The Reductions
The proofs of our results are by reduction from a restricted
version of 3SAT. The reduction behind Theorem 1 is in-
spired by an argument of Ronn [1990] showing that STABLE-
ROOMMATES with ties is NP-complete. Theorem 3 introduces
triangles into this reduction to allow strict preferences.
We sketch the proof of Theorem 1 but omit proofs of the
other claims due to space constraints. The omitted arguments
are similar to the one given, but more complicated due to
SNS-like stability concepts imposing little structure. Full
proofs are given in the appendices A, B, and C.
PROOF OF THEOREM 1 (SKETCH). We reduce from (3,B2)-
SAT, which is 3SAT restricted to formulas in which each clause
contains exactly 3 literals, and each variable occurs exactly
twice positively and twice negatively [Berman et al., 2003].
Given an instance formula ϕ with variable set X and clause
set C, we construct the following agent set N:⋃
x∈X{x1,x1,x2,x2,xa,x′a,x′′a ,xb,x′b,x′′b}∪
⋃
c∈C{c1, . . . ,c9}.
The four occurrences (two positive ones and two negative
ones) of a variable x ∈ X are called x1,x2,x1,x2. respectively.
For a clause c= `1∨`2∨`3, we write c(`1) := c1, c(`2) := c4,
c(`3) = c7. Construct orderings (>i)i∈N as follows:
x1 : xa > x2 > c(x1) xa : x1 ∼ x1 > x′a c1 : `1 > c2 > c9
x2 : xb > x1 > c(x2) xb : x2 ∼ x2 > x′b c4 : `2 > c5 > c3
x1 : xa > x2 > c(x1) x′a : xa > x
′′
a c7 : `3 > c8 > c6
x2 : xb > x1 > c(x2) x′b : xb > x
′′
b ci : ci+1 > ci−1
x′′a : x
′
a x
′′
b : x
′
b
For each agent i we have only listed i’s friends Fi, each friend
being strictly better than i. Any agent not mentioned in i’s list
is an enemy, i.e., an element of Ei. Figure 1(a) illustrates the
orderings (>i)i∈N . Note that no agent has more than 3 friends,
and that these orderings are mutual.
By the assumptions of Theorem 1, there is a poly-time
many-one reduction that takes a formula ϕ as input and outputs
the binary encoding of a game G = 〈N,(<i)i∈N〉 ∈ C that is
consistent on pairs, {0-1}-toxic and weakly {1-1,2-2,3-3}-
toxic with respect to the (>i)i∈N given above. We show that ϕ
is satisfiable if and only if G admits a CR-stable partition.
Let A be a satisfying assignment of ϕ. Take the partition
pi = {{`,c(`)} : ` a true variable occurrence}
∪{{xa,x1},{xb,x2} : x ∈ X set true in A}
∪{{xa,x1},{xb,x2} : x ∈ X set false in A}
∪{{x′a,x′′a},{x′b,x′′b} : x ∈ X}
∪{{ci,ci+1}, . . . ,{c j} : c ∈C}.
In the last line we partition clause players that are not matched
to true variables into pairs and singletons in some stable way
as in Figure 1(a), see full proof for details.
We show that pi is CR-stable in G. Since pi is IR, no singleton
blocks. By consistency on pairs, it can be checked that no
coalition of size 2 blocks. Now let S be a coalition with |S|> 3.
Consider the friendship graph on N with friends connected by
an edge. This graph has girth 6 and does not contain a cubic
subgraph. If S contained an isolated agent or a leaf (a member
with at most 1 friend in S), then S is not blocking by {0-1}-
toxicity and weak {1-1}-toxicity. So S contains a cycle and
thus |S|> 6. Since S is not cubic, there is an agent, matched
in pi, who has 2 friends in S and so by weak {2-2}-toxicity
is worse off in S, so S does not block. Hence there are no
blocking coalitions and pi is in the core.
Let pi be a CR-stable partition of G. We sketch an argu-
ment giving a satisfying assignment of ϕ. Because the players
{c1, . . . ,c9} of a clause are unstable on their own (toxicity
limits coalitions within them to size 2, no agent wants to be
clockwise last in a coalition, and the number of members is
odd), stability of pi implies that for each clause one of its
players must be in a coalition with the literal connected to it.
Define a propositional assignment A so that all literals in a
coalition with a c-player are set true, and set other variables
arbitrarily. This assignment is well-defined. Indeed, suppose
variable x is to be set both true and false. Then WLOG ei-
ther both x1 and x1 or both x1 and x2 are matched with their
c1. Either {xa,x1} or {x1,x2} will then end up blocking, a
contradiction. Clearly, A satisfies ϕ.
6 Applications
Our NP-hardness results have implications for many well-
known classes of hedonic games. In this section we briefly
describe some of these (see [Aziz and Savani, 2015] for details)
and check which of our conditions they satisfy. In this way,
we recover—and sometimes strengthen—a number of known
hardness results for these games. We also introduce five new
classes of games, and show how our framework allows us to
deduce hardness results for them with ease. See the appendix
for more details.
Individually Rational Coalition Lists (IRCL). Balles-
ter [2004] proposes to represent a hedonic game by listing
the agent preferences <i explicitly from best to worst, but
cutting the list off after the entry {i}. This representation
is complete, but not always succinct. Ballester proves that
for α ∈ {CR,NS,IS} deciding α-EXISTENCE is NP-complete
under this representation. We deduce these results by consid-
ering IRCLs that list the pairs {i, j} for j ∈ Fi. Since Theo-
rems 1 and 2 apply even if each agent has only 3 friends, we
therefore have a hardness result for α ∈ {SNS,SIS,CR,NS,IS}
4
(a)
x1
x1
x2
x2
xa xb
5
4
3
5
4
3
5 5
3 3
(b)
x1
x1
x2
x2
xbxa xc xd
65
4
3
5 6
4
3
6
7
5 6
7
5
3 3
(c)
x1 x1
x2 x2
c c
c c
Figure 1: Graphical presentations of the 3SAT reductions used. Figure (a) is used in Theorem 1, (b) in Theorem 3, and (c) in Theorem 2.
Agents not connected by an edge are enemies. The gray sets of agents indicate a stable partition pi in the hedonic game. The 9-gons form
clause gadgets in (a) and (b) and a variable gadget in (c). On their own, these groups of 9 players do not admit a stable outcome. So in (a) and
(b), stability can only occur if for each clause one of its agents can be connected to one of its (true) literals, i.e. if the underlying formula is
satisfiable. In (c), each variable must be set true or false for stability to occur.
even if the list of each agent includes at most 3 entries, each
of which is a pair. A similar result is shown by Deineko
and Woeginger [2013]. They prove that CR-EXISTENCE FOR
IRCL is hard even for lists of length 2, with entries being
coalitions of size 3. Theorem 3 applies if we allow lists up
to length 9, which can encode a triangle-appreciating game
where agents have up to 4 friends.
Hedonic Coalition Nets. Elkind and Wooldridge [2009]
study a rule-based representation for hedonic games in which
agents’ preferences are described by weighted boolean for-
mulas. It can be shown that polynomial size nets are suf-
ficient to describe, for any collection of orderings (>i)i∈N ,
a game satisfying all our conditions, implying hardness of
α-EXISTENCE for all α considered in this work. This is
perhaps not surprising: while Elkind and Wooldridge only
establish the hardness of CR-EXISTENCE in their work, they
show that one can compile an IRCL representation into a
hedonic coalition net representation with at most polynomial
overhead. Because our hardness results hold even if each
player is only allowed 3 or 4 friends, we can say in addition
that α-EXISTENCE for hedonic coalition nets remains hard
even if we restrict each player’s preferences to be described
by at most 4 or 5 formulas, and even if the weights of these
formulas are given in unary.
Stable Roommates. The reduction behind Theorem 1 is a
modified version of Ronn’s construction showing that CR-
EXISTENCE FOR SRT, the stable roommate problem with
ties, is NP-complete [Ronn, 1990]. It is thus no surprise
that the class of stable roommate problems, considered as
hedonic games in which sets with 3 or more members are
unacceptable, fulfills the conditions of Theorem 1 (but note
that this formulation corresponds to SRTI, not SRT). Indeed,
CR-EXISTENCE FOR SRTI remains hard even if the preference
list of each agent has length at most 3, and by Theorem 2
this is also true of NS- and IS-EXISTENCE. Now, consider a
generalization of STABLE-ROOMMATES where rooms have
capacity 1, 2, or 3, and rooms with capacity 3 are generally
preferred because they are cheaper per person. Then it can be
checked that the conditions of Theorems 2 and 3 are satisfied,
giving hardness of α-EXISTENCE for all α for this model.
Stable Marriages. A version of Theorem 2 implies that NS-
EXISTENCE FOR SMI, the stable marriage problem with
incomplete lists, is NP-complete. This extends the NP-
completeness result for SMTI obtained by [Aziz, 2013].
Aziz also notes that it is possible to embed SMTI into other
classes C of hedonic games, and thus to deduce hardness of
NS-EXISTENCE FOR C; this observation provides an (alterna-
tive) method of deriving hardness results for several classes
of hedonic games.
W-preferences. Cechla´rova´ and Hajdukova´ [2004b] consider
hedonic games where each agent first ranks all other agents
and then compares coalitions based on their worst member
under this ranking. Clearly, the game so obtained is con-
sistent on pairs and strictly {k-1}-toxic for all k. It follows
that (with ties allowed) CR-EXISTENCE is NP-hard by Theo-
rem 1 (a result first obtained by [Cechla´rova´ and Hajdukova´,
2004b]), and that NS- and IS-EXISTENCE are NP-complete
by Theorem 2, first shown by Aziz et al. [2012]. NS- and
IS-EXISTENCE are hard even if preferences are strict; the
latter result was previously unknown.
WB-preferences. Noting that agents inW-hedonic games are
extremely pessimistic, Cechla´rova´ and Hajdukova´ [2004a]
propose a compromise: Agents still rank coalitions according
to their worst member, but break ties in favor of the coalition
with better best member. Again the game obtained is consis-
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tent on pairs and strictly {k-1}-toxic for all k, so CR-, NS-,
and IS-EXISTENCE are hard.
W- and B-hedonic games. In these two classes of games
[Aziz et al., 2012; Aziz et al., 2013], agents rank coalitions
according to their worst or best member, but coalitions
containing an enemy are not individually rational. As for
W-preferences, we see that CR-, NS-, and IS-EXISTENCE are
hard.
In all of the following classes of games, agents first assign
cardinal utilities vi( j) ∈ R to all agents in N = {1, . . . ,n}, and
then lift these utilities to coalitions (e.g., by computing the
sum or average of the utilities of coalition members).
The following method of constructing integer-valued func-
tions vi : N→ R from orderings (>i)i∈N will be used repeat-
edly: given x,y ∈ Z, we set vi(i) = 0, vi( j) = x for j ∈ Ei and
let y 6 vi( j) 6 y+ n for j ∈ Fi so that for each j,k ∈ Fi we
have vi( j)> vi(k) iff j>i k (this is accomplished by assigning
utility y+ k+1 to friends at the k-th ‘preference level’). We
refer to such utilities as Jx,yK-utilities.
Additively Separable Games (ASGs). In these games, pref-
erences are given by S<i T iff ∑ j∈S vi( j)>∑ j∈T vi( j). This
class of games satisfies all our theorems, so α-EXISTENCE is
hard for all α we consider. Indeed, given N = {1, . . . ,n} and
(>i)i∈N , we consider the ASG with J−(n2+2n),4K-utilities.
Then a coalition containing an enemy of i is not individually
rational for i, so this game is strictly {k-1}-toxic for all k, and
it is obviously consistent on pairs, triangle-appreciating and
monotone on triangles. α-EXISTENCE remains hard even
if players are allowed at most 3 or 4 friends (depending on
α), so for ASGs, it remains hard even if vi( j) is positive
for at most 3 or 4 agents j. This improves on the reduction
in [Sung and Dimitrov, 2010], where agents have up to 11
friends.
Fractional Hedonic Games (FHGs). This class of games
was recently proposed by Aziz et al. [2014]. Preferences
are given by S <i T iff 1/|S|∑ j∈S vi( j) > 1/|T |∑ j∈T vi( j).
Brandl et al. [2015] have shown hardness of CR-, NS-,
and IS-EXISTENCE. We recover these results and comple-
ment them by showing hardness of SSNS-, SNS-, SIS- and
SCR-EXISTENCE; all these results hold even if the underly-
ing preferences are strict. FHGs with J−(n2+5n),5K-utilities
satisfy all of our properties; choosing y= 5 ensures triangle-
appreciation.
Social FHGs. An FHG is social if agents’ utilities for each
other are non-negative. Theorem 3 applies to the class of
social FHGs. Indeed, given (>i)i∈N we can construct a social
FHG with J0,7nK-utilities. Toxicity follows from vi( j) >
7n for j ∈ Fi, and other properties can be checked as for
FHGs. To ensure that our framework applies to social FHGs,
we carefully crafted our constructions to only require weak
toxicity whenever possible.
The next five classes of hedonic games are based on fairly
intuitive ways of deriving utilities for coalitions from utilities
for individual players; however, to the best of our knowledge
we are the first to consider the computational complexity of
stability-related probems for these games (median games have
been suggested by [Hajdukova´, 2006] as an interesting topic;
the other four classes appear to be entirely new).
Median Games. Agents evaluate coalitions according to their
median value, which in odd-size coalitions is the middle
element, and in even-size coalitions is the mean of the middle
two elements. Median games with J0,5K-utilities satisfy
Theorem 3. Notice that in this construction vi( j) are non-
negative, so hardness holds even for ‘social median games’
with non-negative underlying utilities. There are various
other ways of defining median games. In particular, we can
use a purely ordinal version by taking the worse of the middle
two players in even-sized coalitions, satisfying Theorem 1;
if agents take either the ordinal or cardinal median of the
coalition S\{i} then both Theorems 1 and 2 apply.
Geometric Mean Games. In these games agents evaluate
coalitions according to the geometric mean |S|
√
∏vi( j) of
member utilities. We obtain the same hardness results as
for FHGs by taking logs.
Nash Product Games. This is the class of games that are
‘multiplicatively separable’; agents evaluate coalitions ac-
cording to ∏ j∈S vi( j). As far as hardness is concerned
these games behave identically to additively separable games,
again by taking logs.
Midrange ( 12B+ 12W). In this case, agents evaluate a coali-
tion by averaging the maximum and minimum utility in it.
With J−3n,1K-utilities, these games are strictly {k-1}-toxic
for all k and consistent on pairs, so Theorems 1 and 2 apply.
r-Approval. Starting with cardinal utilities, sum the (up to)
r highest elements of a coalition. If r > 3, then games
with J−6rn,4K-utilities satisfy the conditions of Theorems 1
and 2. If r > 4, they satisfy the conditions of Theorem 3.
7 Conclusions
We have developed a framework that enables us to prove
NP-hardness of α-EXISTENCE FOR C for many choices of α
and C. Our results show that problems in this family tend to
be hard even for representation formalisms with very limited
expressivity, and, moreover, are unlikely to admit an efficient
parametrized algorithm for many natural choices of parameter
(such as length and coalition size in the IRCL representation
or number of formulas per agent in the hedonic coalition nets
representation). However, they also indicate which features
of hedonic games may lead to tractability of stability-related
problems. In particular, restricting the number of different
‘preference intensities’ (e.g., the range of vi( j) in ASGs, FHGs,
and median games) rules out consistency on pairs, so one may
hope for easiness results when this number is small.
While we focused on the problem of checking whether
a stable partition exists, another important stability-related
problem is checking whether a specific partition is stable.
This problem is in P for IS and NS for all classes of hedonic
games considered here, simply because the number of possible
deviations is polynomially bounded; however, for notions of
stability that are based on group deviations it is often coNP-
complete. It would be interesting to extend our framework to
handle this problem as well.
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Since verifying stability is often hard, α-EXISTENCE FOR C
is usually not known to be in NP for stability notions based
on group deviations. Thus most of our hardness results do not
have a tight complexity upper bound. For all representation
formalisms we consider, these problems are in Σp2 , and CR-
EXISTENCE FOR ASGS is known to be complete for this
complexity class [Woeginger, 2013b]. A natural open question
is whether our framework can be extended from NP-hardness
proofs to Σp2 -hardness proofs.
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A Proof of Theorem 1
Theorem. SIS- and CR-EXISTENCE 〈SNS-EXISTENCE〉 FOR
C is NP-hard if for each N and every collection of orderings
(>i)i∈N there is a game 〈N,(<i)i∈N〉 ∈ C that is consistent on
pairs, {0-1}-toxic 〈{0-1,1-1}-toxic〉 and weakly {1-1,2-2}-
toxic with respect to (>i)i∈N .
We will prove both statements in the theorem together, with
the proof for SNS-EXISTENCE added in 〈〉-brackets. Proof
by reduction from (3,B2)-SAT (each clause contains exactly
3 literals, each variable occurs exactly twice positively and
twice negatively).
Given a formula ϕ we denote
(a) for any variable x its four occurrences by x1, x2, x1, x2,
(b) for any variable occurence `, c(`) is the clause that `
occurs in.
Given an instance ϕ of (3,B2)-SAT, take the following set N
of agents, with 9 agents per clause and 10 agents per variable.
N ={c1, . . . ,c9 | c ∈ Clauses(ϕ)}
∪{x1,x2,x1,x2,xa,x′a,x′′a ,xb,x′b,x′′b | x ∈ Var(ϕ)}.
For a clause c = `1 ∨ `2 ∨ `3, where `i is a variable occur-
rence, we will connect c1 with `1, c4 with `2, and c7 with `3.
For c1, c4, c7, we call the variable occurrence connected with
them ‘its literal’. For a variable occurrence `, we will call the
ci player connected with it ‘its clause player’ and denote it by
c(`). We generate the following orderings, which only show
the friends of each player. The last entry of player i’s list is
strictly better than i who is strictly better than all players not
mentioned.
c1 : `1 > c2 > c9
c4 : `2 > c5 > c3
c7 : `3 > c8 > c6
ci : ci+1 > ci−1 for i 6= 1,4,7 with subscripts mod 9
x1 : xa > x2 > c(x1)
x1 : xa > x2 > c(x1)
x2 : xb > x1 > c(x2)
x2 : xb > x1 > c(x2)
xa : x1 ∼ x1 > x′a
x′a : xa > x
′′
a
x′′a : x
′
a
xb : x2 ∼ x2 > x′b
x′b : xb > x
′′
b
x′′b : x
′
b
Notice the following facts:
• No player has more than 3 friends.
• The orderings are mutual: j is i’s friend if and only if i is
j’s friend.
• The friendship graph has girth 6. In particular, it is
triangle-free.
By the assumptions of the theorem, we can in polynomial time
find a hedonic game which is consistent on pairs, {0-1}-toxic
x1
x1
x2
x2
xa xbx′ax′′a x′b x
′′
b
5
4
3
5
4
3
5 5
3 3
〈{0-1,1-1}-toxic〉, and weakly {1-1,2-2}-toxic with respect
to the orderings given. We show that ϕ is satisfiable if and
only if this game admits a core- and SIS-stable 〈SNS-stable〉
partition.
Satisfiable⇒ Stable.
Suppose A is a satisfying assignment for ϕ. Construct the
following partition pi of N, which consists only of pairs and
singletons:
• Match true variable occurrences with their clause player.
• If x is false then {x1,xa},{x2,xb} ∈ pi.
If x is true then {x1,xa},{x2,xb} ∈ pi.
• {x′a,x′′a} ∈ pi and {x′b,x′′b} ∈ pi.
• For each clause, match the non-matched c-players in
some stable way:
– If exactly 1 player is matched with a variable
occurrence, say c1 is matched, then we take
{c2,c3},{c4,c5},{c6,c7},{c8,c9} ∈ pi.
– If exactly 2 players are matched with a vari-
able occurrence, say c1 and c4 are matched, then
{c2,c3},{c5},{c6,c7},{c8,c9} ∈ pi.
– If all 3 players are matched with a variable occur-
rence, then {c2,c3},{c5,c6},{c8,c9} ∈ pi.
Each of these three cases is illustrated in the drawing
above.
Suppose that pi H−→ pi′ for some H ⊆ N with pi′ i pi for all
i ∈ H. We will prove that this is not an SIS-deviation 〈not an
SNS-deviation〉. Note that if there are no SIS-deviations, then
pi is also core-stable.
Some terminology and observations:
• an agent is matched if it is in a pair in pi, and lonely if it
is in a singleton in pi (these terms always refer to pi and
never to pi′).
• an agent is a deviator if it is in H, and a non-deviator
otherwise.
• no 2 enemies are together in pi.
• any 2 lonely players have distance at least 5, which in the
following will mean that at most 1 player in a coalition
considered below can be lonely.
8
By definition of pi H−→ pi′, no two non-deviators can be in
the same coalition in pi′ if they weren’t together in pi already.
This fact will be used often and not particularly stressed in the
following argument.
Lemma 1. No matched deviator i has exactly 2 friends in
pi′(i).
Proof. Suppose i is a matched deviator and ends up in a
coalition S ∈ pi′ which includes exactly 2 friends of i. Since i
prefers pi′ to pi, by weak {2-2}-toxicity, S includes at most 1
enemy of i, so |S| is either 3 or 4.
j i k
If |S| is 3, say S= {i, j,k}, then since the game is triangle-
free and friendship is mutual, each of j and k have 1 friend
(namely i) and 1 enemy in S. Since j and k are enemies,
they are not together in pi and hence they cannot be both non-
deviators (and still end up in the same coalition in pi′). Say j is
a deviator. Then j cannot be matched by weak {1-1}-toxicity
( j has an enemy in S). So j is lonely and hence k is not lonely
since lonely players are far apart. Now k is made worse off by
the deviation (since k is not lonely and by weak 1-1-toxicity),
so the deviation is not SIS. 〈With {1-1}-toxicity, j is not made
happier by the deviation, so not an SNS deviation.〉
j i k
`
Suppose |S| is 4, say S = {i, j,k, `} where ` is an enemy
of i. Suppose first that ` had no friends in S. Then ` is not
better off under pi′ by {0-1}-toxicity and thus is a non-deviator.
Since j and k were not previously together with `, they must
both be deviators. If either of them was matched, they’d now
be unhappy by weak {1-1}-toxicity. Since they are deviators,
they cannot be unhappy, and hence both were lonely. But then
i is friends with 2 lonely players, contradiction. Hence ` has a
friend in S. Since there are no 4-cycles in the game, ` cannot
be friends with both j and k, and thus must be friends with
exactly 1 of j and k, say k. So j and ` are enemies. Since they
are not together under pi, at least 1 of them must be a deviator,
say j. Since there are enemies in S, j must have been lonely,
and hence ` is not lonely. Now ` is made worse off by the
deviation (since ` is not lonely), so the deviation is not SIS.
〈With {1-1}-toxicity, j is not made happier by the deviation,
so not SNS.〉
Lemma 2. No matched deviator i has exactly 3 friends in
pi′(i).
Proof. Suppose i is a matched deviator and ends up in a coali-
tion S ∈ pi′ which includes exactly 3 friends of i, called j, k, `
who are (necessarily) pairwise enemies. Thus at least 2 of the
3 friends, say j and k, must deviate, and thus at least 1 of these
3 friends is a matched deviator, say j. By weak {1-1,2-2}-
toxicity, j must have at least 3 friends in S, including i. Apart
from i, 1 more friend of j must deviate, called m. Now one of
m and k must be matched, so is a matched deviator, and hence
must have 3 friends in S. Hence S contains at least 3 players
with 3 friends in S. Also |S|> 5, and hence S cannot include
matched deviators who only have 2 or fewer friends in S, by
toxicity. Call a matched player in S with at most 2 friends in S
sad. Then S consists of lonely players, players with 3 friends
in S, and at most 2 sad players (who are non-deviators). If
there are 2 sad players, they must be together in pi.
Now if a player of type xa is in S, then either xa is sad or
x′a ∈ S and x′a is sad. Similarly for xb. Further, if a player of
type c1/c4/c7 is in S, then either he is sad, or a neighbour of it is
in S and sad. Therefore at most 1 player of type xa/xb/c1/c4/c7
can be in S. Suppose a literal player x1 is in S. Then either
x1 is sad, or else both c(x1) ∈ S and xa ∈ S, but we previously
said that there is at most 1 of these players in S, so this is
impossible. Thus all literal players in S must be sad, and so
there is at most 1 literal player in S. Hence there are at most
2 degree-3 players in S, contradicting our observation before
that there are at least 3.
Now suppose i is a matched deviator (with {i, j} ∈ pi). Then
by the lemmas, i must end up in a coalition S ∈ pi′ which
includes exactly 1 friend of i. By weak {1-1}-toxicity, S
must be a pair, S = {i,k}, say. Since pi′ i pi because i is a
deviator, we must have k >i j by consistency on pairs. Now
by inspection it is seen that in pi there is no edge {i, j} that
is strictly better than pi for both i and j. Hence k cannot be
strictly better off in {i,k} than k is in pi. So k is not a deviator,
and hence is either lonely or matched to a deviator.
We now go through each type i of matched player and show
that there is no edge {i,k} satisfying these conditions: any
preferred edge (if any) involves a partner who is matched to a
non-deviator.
• x′′a and x′′b , xa and xb, and false variable occurrences are
in a favourite edge, so none of them are deviators.
• x′a and x′b have a strictly preferred edge with xa and xb
respectively, but these are matched to false variable oc-
currences who we know are non-deviators.
• True variable occurrences: all preferred edges are part-
nered with a non-deviating player.
• Those c1, c4, or c7 players matched to their literal player
are in their favourite edge so not deviating.
• Those ci players together with ci+1 are either in their
favourite edge or (if they have a literal friend) that friend
is false, so together with a non-deviator.
• Those ci players together with ci−1 such that ci+1 is in a
pair where both members are confirmed non-deviators are
themselves then clearly non-deviators. Such ci players
exist: namely those preceding a c-player matched with
their literal. If we repeat this observation, we find that all
matched c-players are non-deviators.
Hence (together with the lemmas above) no matched player
is a deviator.
Now consider a lonely player i. If i deviates, then i ends up
in a coalition S ∈ pi′ consisting of lonely players and possibly
2 players that are in a pair in pi (because no matched players
are deviators). If S consists entirely of lonely players, then
by {0-1}-toxicity, i is not better off, so won’t deviate. Hence
S also contains 2 players in a pair. At least 1 of these 2 is
enemies with i and is thus worse off by weak {1-1}-toxicity,
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so this is not an SIS-deviation. 〈With {1-1}-toxicity, i is not
better off in S, so not an SNS-deviation.〉
Thus we conclude that no player is a deviator. Hence pi is
SIS-stable 〈SNS-stable〉.
Stable⇒ Satisfiable.
Suppose pi is a core-stable partition of the game. We show that
ϕ is then satisfiable.
Lemma 3. The 9 players of a clause cannot all be together in
the same coalition in pi.
Proof. If they were, then {c2,c3} would block by weak {2-2}-
toxicity.
Lemma 4. For any given clause, at least 1 of its players must
be together with their literal player in pi.
Proof. Suppose not. Let T = {c1, . . . ,c9}. Suppose 3 or more
agents from T are together in S ∈ pi. Take an agent ci ∈ S
such that ci−1 6∈ S (this exists since T 6∈ pi). By weak {1,1}-
toxicity, ci prefers any edge to S. Under pi, ci−1 can have
at most one friend (because ci is committed to S 63 ci−1 and
we assumed that ci−1 is not together with its literal player).
Thus under pi, ci−1 is not better off than {ci−2,ci−1} (again
by weak {1,1}-toxicity). It follows that {ci−1,ci} is blocking
pi, a contradiction. So at most two agents from T are in the
same coalition in pi. Since |T | is odd, there is a ci not together
with any other agent from T in pi. By our assumption that ci
has no literal friends, this ci has no friends in pi(ci), so is not
better off than being alone by {0,1}-toxicity. On the other
hand, ci−1 is not better off than {ci−2,ci−1}. It follows that
{ci−1,ci} is blocking pi.
Lemma 5. No ci can have 3 friends in pi. A ci together with
its literal has at most 1 enemy in pi.
Proof. Suppose ci does have 3 friends in pi.
ci−2
ci+1 ci−1
ci
x
In particular, ci is together with ci−1. If ci is also together with
ci−2, then each of ci−1 and ci−2 have at most 2 friends in pi
(their degree is 2), but at least 2 enemies (the 2 other friends
of ci). Hence {ci−1,ci−2} blocks by weak {1-1,2-2}-toxicity.
Hence ci−2 is in a different coalition from ci−1; thus ci−2 has
at most 1 friend in pi. On the other hand ci−1 has 1 friend but
at least 2 enemies in pi. Hence by weak {1-1}-toxicity and
consistency on pairs, {ci−1,ci−2} blocks. So ci cannot have 3
friends in pi.
Now to the second claim. We know ci has at most 2 friends
in pi. Suppose ci ∈ S ∈ pi, where ci has 2 enemies in S, and
its literal player is part of S. By weak {1-1,2-2}-toxicity, ci
prefers any edge to S. If ci−1 6∈ S, then {ci,ci−1} blocks. If
ci−1 ∈ S but ci−2 6∈ S then {ci,ci−1} blocks. If both ci−1 ∈ S
and ci−2 ∈ S then |S|> 5 (S includes ci, the literal, ci−1, and
two enemies of ci), so that {ci−1,ci−2} blocks since they have
at most 2 friends and at least 2 enemies.
Lemma 6. x1 and x1 cannot both be together with their clause
player.
Proof. Suppose they are. Now if xa was together with both
x1 and x1 in pi, this would mean that the associated clause
players have more than 1 enemy which is impossible. So xa
has at most 2 friends. But if xa had friends x′a and x1 then the
clause player of x1 would have enemies xa and x′a, which is
impossible. So xa has either no or 1 friend in pi.
Suppose xa has as friend either x1 or x1 in pi. Then by weak
{1-1}-toxicity (since the clause player is an enemy), {xa,x′a}
blocks.
Hence either xa has no friends in pi, or its only friend is x′a.
Now if either x1 or x1 has only 1 friend in pi, then {xa,x1}
or {xa,x1} blocks. So both x1 and x1 have 2 friends in pi, so
x1 is together with x2 and x1 is together with x2. Since the
clause players of x1 and x1 can have at most 1 enemy in pi,
it follows that x2 and x2 have only 1 friend in pi (namely x1
and x1 respectively). It follows that xb has at most 1 friend,
namely possibly x′b. Hence by weak {1-1}-toxicity, {xb,x2}
blocks.
Lemma 7. x1 and x2 cannot both be together with their clause
player.
Proof. Suppose they were. Since the clause players can have
at most 1 enemy, x1 and x2 cannot be in the same coalition in pi.
Now if x1 and x2 both have only 1 friend (their clause player)
in pi, then {x1,x2} blocks by consistency on pairs. Otherwise,
at least 1 of them, say x1, has 2 friends in pi, hence is together
with xa. Since x1’s clause player can have at most 1 enemy, x′a
is not in the same coalition. But then {xa,x′a} blocks by weak{1-1}-toxicity.
Define a propositional assignment A that sets literals that
are in a coalition with their clause player true. By the last
two lemmas, this is well-defined. By the lemma before, each
clause has at least 1 literal that is set true by A. Hence A
satisfies ϕ.
B Proof of Theorem 2
B.1 Bipartite Case
We call a collection of orderings (>i)i∈N bipartite if the friend-
ship graph is bipartite, i.e. there is a partition (N1,N2) of the
agent set N such that for each i ∈ N1 we have Fi ⊆ N2 and for
each i ∈ N2 we have Fi ⊆ N1. The following theorem gives a
hardness result even for bipartite preferences, and so it applies
for example to the stable marriage case. This result works for
Nash stability but not for individual stability (and it cannot, for
individual stability is poly-time solvable for stable marriages).
The next section will consider the non-bipartite case which
also applies to individual stability.
Theorem. NS-EXISTENCE FOR C is NP-complete if for all
N and every strict bipartite collection of orderings (>i)i∈N
there is a game 〈N,(<i)i∈N〉 ∈ C that is consistent on pairs
and strictly {0-1,1-1,2-5}-toxic with respect to (>i)i∈N .
The problem is in NP since a Nash-stable partition is a
certificate: we can in polynomial time check for each player i
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whether he wishes to deviate (this follows from the definition
of a polynomially representable class).
We reduce from (3,B2)-SAT (each clause contains exactly
3 literals, each variable occurs exactly twice positively and
twice negatively).
Given a formula ϕ we denote
(a) for any variable x its four occurrences by x1, x2, x1, x2,
(b) for any variable occurence `, c(`) is the clause that `
occurs in.
We will introduce 9 players for each variable and 1 player
for each clause.
N ={xstalker,xmain,xpos,xneg,xgarbage | x ∈ Var(ϕ)}
∪{x1,x2,x1,x2 | x ∈ Var(ϕ)}
∪{c | c ∈ Clauses(ϕ)}.
We take the following strict orderings, which only show
the friends of each player. The last entry of player i’s list is
strictly better than i who is strictly better than all players not
mentioned.
xstalker : xmain
x1 : c(x1)> xpos > xmain
x2 : c(x2)> xpos > xgarbage
x1 : c(x1)> xneg > xmain
x2 : c(x2)> xneg > xgarbage
c : its three variable occurrences in any order
xmain : x1 > x1
xpos : x1 > x2
xneg : x1 > x2
xgarbage : x2 > x2.
Notice that no one has more than 3 friends, and that these
orderings are bipartite: all friends of a red player are blue, all
friends of a blue player are red.
Let G be any hedonic game that is consistent on pairs and
strictly {0-1,1-1,2-5}-toxic with respect to these orderings.
This game has a Nash stable outcome if and only if ϕ is
satisfiable.
c
7
5
6 x2
2
3
xgarbage
1 x2
3
c′
xpos
4
xneg
4
c′′ x1 2 xmain 1 x1 c
′′′
xstalker
OO
Satisfiable⇒ NS-stable
Suppose A is a satisfying assignment for ϕ. For a clause c, let
true(c) be the first variable occurrence in c that is set true by
A (this must exist since A satisfies ϕ).
We call a variable occurrence ` matched if it is true(c) for
its clause c, and unmatched otherwise.
We now describe a partition pi of N that is Nash stable in G.
• {xstalker} is always alone.
• {c, true(c)} forms a love marriage.
• Suppose now that x is true in A.
– {xmain,x1}.
– {xneg,x2}.
– If x1 is matched and x2 is matched, then {xpos} and
{xgarbage}.
– If x1 is matched and x2 is unmatched, then {x2,xpos}
and {xgarbage}.
– If x1 is unmatched and x2 is matched, then {x1,xpos}
and {xgarbage}.
– If x1 is unmatched and x2 is unmatched, then
{x1,xpos} and {x2,xgarbage}.
• Suppose now that x is false in A. (everything is symmet-
ric to the positive case)
– {xmain,x1}.
– {xpos,x2}.
– If x1 is matched and x2 is matched, then {xneg} and
{xgarbage}.
– If x1 is matched and x2 is unmatched, then {x2,xneg}
and {xgarbage}.
– If x1 is unmatched and x2 is matched, then {x1,xneg}
and {xgarbage}.
– If x1 is unmatched and x2 is unmatched, then
{x1,xneg} and {x2,xgarbage}.
The pi as above is Nash stable (note all coalitions have size
at most 2, so it is a marriage matching). It is easily seen
to be individually rational since no one is together with an
enemy and consistency on pairs holds. Notice that because
the underlying preferences are bipartite they are triangle-free
which means that no player ever wants to join a pair of players
because at least one of them is an enemy and strict {0-1,1-1}-
toxicity holds. So any possible Nash deviation would involve
a player joining a singleton coalition. The only players that
are possibly single in pi are xpos,xneg,xgarbage,xstalker.
• No one is friends with xstalker so no one can benefit by
joining him.
• Player xpos is single only if both x1 and x2 are matched,
and because they prefer their clause to xpos, they do not
benefit by joining xpos. No one else is friends with xpos,
so they do not join either.
• Similarly for xneg.
• Player xgarbage is single only in situations where his
friends x2 and x2 are together with either their clauses or
the xpos,xneg players. Both x2 and x2 prefer this situation
to joining xgarbage.
Hence no deviations are possible and thus pi is stable.
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NS-stable⇒ satisfiable
Suppose pi is NS-stable in G.
Lemma 8. All coalitions in pi have size 1 or 2.
Proof. Remember that no player has more than 3 friends. Let
S ∈ pi with |S|> 3. Then by toxicity and individual rationality
of pi, each player has either 3 friends in S, or 2 friends in
S but at most 4 enemies in S. So each member of S has
‘degree’ at least 2, and thus S contains a cycle1. All cycles in
G have length 8 or more2, thus |S|> 8. If some member i of
S had exactly 2 friends in S, then i would have 5 enemies in
contradiction to individual rationality by strict {2-5}-toxicity.
Hence every i ∈ S has exactly 3 friends in S. The only players
who have 3 friends are variable occurrences x1,x2,x1,x2 and
clauses c. If some variable occurrence were in S then so would
be its friends of types xmain,xpos,xneg,xgarbage who themselves
cannot have 3 friends. Hence S can only contain clause players;
but no two clause players are friends.
Thus every player is either alone or together with exactly 1
friend. Consider xmain. If he is alone, then xstalker will want to
join him. Since pi is Nash stable, this cannot happen. So xmain
is together with a friend, which is either x1 or x1.
Define the following propositional assignment A:
A(x) = true ⇐⇒ {xmain,x1} ∈ pi
A(x) = false ⇐⇒ {xmain,x1} ∈ pi
By what we said above, this is well-defined. We will show
that A satisfies ϕ.
Let c be a clause. If c is alone in pi then one of its literals
joins c (and is welcome to do so). Hence c is not alone and
thus together with one of its literals, say `. We show that ` is
true under A.
Suppose not and it is false. Of the two false literal oc-
currences of a variable, the first is in a pair with xmain by
definition of A. Thus the second occurrence (`) is the one
together with the clause; for concreteness suppose the situ-
ation is {xmain,x1} ∈ pi and {x2,c} ∈ pi. It then follows that
{xpos} ∈ pi because both friends of xpos are otherwise engaged.
But then x1 wants to join xpos (and is welcome to do so). This
is a contradiction to pi being stable. Hence ` is true.
Therefore each clause contains a true literal under A and
hence A satisfies ϕ. Thus ϕ is satisfiable.
B.2 Non-bipartite case
Theorem. NS- and IS-EXISTENCE FOR C are NP-complete
if for all N and every strict collection of orderings (>i)i∈N
there is a game 〈N,(<i)i∈N〉 ∈ C that is consistent on pairs
and strictly {0-1,1-1,2-5}-toxic with respect to (>i)i∈N .
1We can use graph theory terminology by referring to a graph on
N with an edge between mutual friends. Note that since xstalker has
only 1 friend, we must have xstalker 6∈ S, so we may pretend that all
friendships are mutual so that all edges are indeed undirected.
2Bipartiteness excludes cycles of odd length, so we need only
check that there are no cycles of length 4 or 6. There are none. A
shortest cycle is xmain→ x1→ xpos→ x2→ xgarbage→ x2→ xneg→
x1→ xmain or cycles like c→ x1→ xpos→ x2→ c′→ y2→ ypos→
y1→ c.
If we do not insist on bipartiteness, we can get a result
for mutual preferences that also holds for IS. This is done by
adding by a 9-gon. The argument that an NS-stable partition
exists will be very similar to before, using triangle-freeness.
Since the girth of the game continues to be at least 8, and
since we have been careful that most deviations considered
are actually IS-deviations, the remainder of the proof needs
few adjustments.
In more detail:
N ={x1, . . . ,x9,xstalker,xmain,xpos,xneg,xgarbage | x ∈ Var(ϕ)}
∪{x1,x2,x1,x2 | x ∈ Var(ϕ)}
∪{c | c ∈ Clauses(ϕ)}.
We take the following strict orderings:
xmain : xstalker > x1 > x1
xstalker : xmain > x1
x1 : xstalker > x2 > x9
xi : xi+1 > xi−1 with superscripts mod 9 (i= 2, . . . ,9)
and everyone else as before. Given an assign-
ment, the partition pi generated is the same as be-
fore, but instead of {xstalker} ∈ pi, we now take
{xstalker,x1},{x2,x3},{x4,x5},{x6,x7},{x8,x9} ∈ pi. Check-
ing that this pi is NS proceeds as before.
Suppose the game has an IS partition pi. Similar to before,
all coalitions in pi have size 1 or 2. We can then see that
we must have {xstalker,x1} ∈ pi. Otherwise, there must be
some single {xi} ∈ pi and then xi−1 will want to join xi and is
welcome to do so. But now xmain cannot be alone, else xstalker
will want to join him and is welcome to do so. Hence xmain
is together with a friend. The rest of the argument can now
proceed as before.
C Proof of Theorem 3
Theorem. 〈SNS-〉, 〈〈SSNS-〉〉, SIS-, CR- and SCR-EXISTENCE
FOR C are NP-hard if for all N and every collection of strict
orderings (>i)i∈N there is a game 〈N,(<i)i∈N〉 ∈ C that is
consistent on pairs, {0-1}-toxic, weakly {1-1,2-2,3-3}-toxic
〈{1-1}-toxic and weakly {2-1}-toxic〉,
〈〈strictly {0-1,1-1}-toxic and weakly {2-1}-toxic〉〉,
intolerant in triangles, triangle-appreciating, and monotone
on triangles with respect to (>i)i∈N .
We will prove all three statements in the theorem together.
Proof by reduction from (3,B2)-SAT.
Given an instance ϕ of (3,B2)-SAT, take the following set N
of agents, with 9 agents per clause and 8 agents per variable.
N ={c1, . . . ,c9 | c ∈ Clauses(ϕ)}
∪{x1,x2,x1,x2,xa,xb,xc,xd | x ∈ Var(ϕ)}.
For a clause c= `1∨ `2∨ `3, where `i is a variable occurrence,
we will connect c1 with `1, c4 with `2, and c7 with `3. For c1,
c4, c7, we call the variable occurrence connected with them
‘its literal’. For a variable occurrence `, we will call the ci
player connected with it ‘its clause player’ and denote it by
c(`). We generate the following orderings, which only show
the friends of each player. The last entry of player i’s list is
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strictly better than i who is strictly better than all players not
mentioned.
c1 : `1 > c2 > c9
c4 : `2 > c5 > c3
c7 : `3 > c8 > c6
ci : ci+1 > ci−1 for i 6= 1,4,7 with subscripts mod 9
x1 : xa > xb > x2 > c(x1)
x1 : xb > xa > x2 > c(x1)
x2 : xc > xd > x1 > c(x2)
x2 : xd > xc > x1 > c(x2)
xa : xb > x1 > x1
xb : xa > x1 > x1
xc : xd > x2 > x2
xd : xc > x2 > x2
x1
x1
x2
x2
xbxa xc xd
65
4
3
5 6
4
3
6
7
5 6
7
5
3 3
These orderings only show the friends of each player. The
last entry of player i’s list is strictly better than i who is strictly
better than all players not mentioned. Notice the following
facts:
• No player has more than 4 friends.
• The orderings are mutual: j is i’s friend if and only if i is
j’s friend.
• The friendship graph has no chordless 4-cycles.
By the assumptions of the theorem, we can in polynomial time
find a hedonic game which satisfies the relevant conditions as
in the theorem statement. We show that ϕ is satisfiable if and
only if this game admits a core- and SIS-stable 〈SNS-stable〉
〈〈SSNS-stable〉〉 partition.
Satisfiable⇒ Stable.
Suppose A is a satisfying assignment for ϕ. Construct the
following partition pi of N, which consists of singletons, pairs,
and triangles:
• Match true variable occurrences with their clause player.
• If x1 is false then {x1,xa,xb} ∈ pi. If x1 is false then
{x1,xa,xb} ∈ pi.
• If x2 is false then {x2,xc,xd} ∈ pi. If x2 is false then
{x2,xc,xd} ∈ pi.
• For each clause, match the non-matched c-players in the
same way as before.
Suppose that pi H−→ pi′ for some H ⊆ N with pi′ i pi 〈〈pi′ <i
pi〉〉 for all i∈H. We will prove that this is not an SIS-deviation
〈not an SNS-deviation〉 〈〈not an SSNS-deviation〉〉. Note that
if there are no SIS-deviations, then pi is also core-stable.
Some terminology and observations:
• an agent is lonely if it is in a singleton in pi and matched
otherwise (these terms always refer to pi and never to pi′).
We also use ‘matched’ for agents in triangles.
• an agent is a deviator if it is in H, and a non-deviator
otherwise.
• no 2 enemies are matched in pi.
• any 2 lonely players have distance 5, which in the fol-
lowing will mean that at most 1 player in a coalition
considered below can be lonely.
Lemma 9. No matched deviator i has exactly 2 friends j and
k in pi′ where j and k are enemies.
Proof. Essentially identical to Lemma 1. Replace “because
there are no 4-cycles” by “because there are no chordless 4-
cycles”, and 〈〈modify remarks about SNS to also include the
SSNS case〉〉.
Lemma 10. No matched deviator i has exactly 2 friends j
and k in pi′ where j and k are friends.
Proof. Suppose not. By weak {2-2}-toxicity, i’s coalition
S in pi′ has size either 3 or 4. 〈By weak {2-1}-toxicity, i’s
coalition S in pi′ has size 3.〉
x1
xa xb
x1
If |S| = 3, then S must be a triangle of the form {x1,xa,xb}
where x1 is true. Now one of xa and xb is made worse off
in this triangle compared to the triangle {x1,xa,xb} which is
part of pi (by monotonicity on triangles), in this case xb. Thus
xb does not deviate. Since pi(x1) = pi(xb) but pi′(x1) 6= pi′(xb),
x1 must deviate. But x1 is now strictly worse off by triangle-
appreciation and monotonicity on triangles, a contradiction.
i
j
?
k
?
`
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Suppose |S| = 4, with S = {i, j,k, `} with {i, j,k} forming a
triangle, and i and ` being enemies. For this case we only have
to worry about SIS-deviations. Suppose first that ` is friends
with both j and k. Now in pi, either {i, j,k} formed a coalition,
in which case S is worse for i by intolerance in triangles, or
{ j,k, `} formed a coalition. In the latter case, ` is made worse
off by i joining (using intolerance in triangles), so that the
deviation is not SIS.
Hence ` is not friends with both j and k. Let’s condition on
whether {i, j,k} ∈ pi or not. If {i, j,k} ∈ pi, then i is worse off
in S by intolerance in triangles. So suppose {i, j,k} 6∈ pi. If `
has no friends in S, then 1 of i, j, k is member of a triangle
in pi that is better than {i, j,k}, and thus is worse off in S by
intolerance in triangles, so no SIS. Similarly if ` has exactly
1 friend in S, say j (it cannot be i who has exactly 2 friends),
then j must be a literal player, and one of i and k was better
off in pi (where they were in a better triangle than {i, j,k}, and
without enemies), so this is not an SIS-deviation.
Lemma 11. No deviator has 3 or 4 friends in pi′.
Proof. Suppose i ∈ S ∈ pi is a deviator where S includes 3 or
4 friends. We condition on the type of i.
i is a clause player: Say i has name ci. ci’s 3 friends are
pairwise enemies, so at least 2 of them deviate, including
another clause player j ∈ {ci+1,ci−1}. If j is matched then j
is worse off since there are 2 enemies in S and j is of degree
2, contradiction. So j is single, and hence j = ci−1. Then the
other clause friend ci+1 of ci is matched and now worse off
so not an SIS deviation. With 〈〈strict〉〉 {1-1}-toxicity, ci−1 is
not made better off unless ci−1 has 2 friends (ci and ci−2) in
S. Since ci+1 does not deviate, ci−2 must deviate. But ci−2 is
matched and has enemies ci and ci+1, so must have 3 friends
which is impossible since ci−2 has degree 2, contradiction.
i is a player of type xa, xb, xc, or xd: Say xa, and pi(xa) =
{xa,xb,x1}. By assumption, xa has 3 friends in S, so both x1
and x1 are in S.
• By intolerance in triangles, this cannot be an SIS devi-
ation unless x1 has at least 3 friends in S, so there is an
extra friend j ∈ S:
x1
xa xb
x1
j
• 〈By weak {2-1}-toxicity, this cannot be an SNS or SSNS
deviation unless 1 of x1 or x1 has at least 3 friends in
S (since one of them deviates). Say x1 has extra friend
j ∈ S, also giving us the picture above.〉
Now both x1 and j have at least 2 enemies in S, and one of
them must deviate, hence have at least 3 friends in S. If this
is j, then |S|> 7 and xa is unhappier by weak {3-3}-toxicity,
contradiction. So j doesn’t deviate and x1 has an extra friend
in S, say k. Since j doesn’t deviate, k does deviate. Since x1
has no lonely friends, k is matched. Hence k has 3 friends in
S. Then |S| > 7 and xa is unhappier by weak {3-3}-toxicity,
contradiction.
i is a literal player, say x1: Suppose first that S includes x2
and c(x1), so that there are 3 friends of x1 in S that are pairwise
enemy, and hence 2 friends who must be deviating. Of those
2, at most 1 is of the xa or xb kind; such a player must have 3
friends in S by intolerance in triangles. All other types must
have 3 friends in S by toxicity. The 2 deviating friends of x1
thus together contribute at least 3 extra friends to S, and hence
|S| > 7. Then at least 1 of the deviating friends of x1 has 3
friends in S but also 3 enemies, and is thus worse off in S, a
contradiction.
Suppose otherwise that S includes exactly 3 friends of x1,
including xa and xb, and also j ∈ {x2,x(c1)}. Suppose xa and
xb do not deviate. Then everyone else (except possibly x1) in
S must deviate; in particular j must deviate and hence have 3
friends in S (which means 2 extra agents in S), who each must
also deviate, which means 1 extra agent for each of the 2 extra
agents in S. Hence |S| > 7 and x1 is worse off in S by weak
{3-3}-toxicity, a contradiction. Otherwise, at least 1 of xa and
xb is deviating. Now unless x1 ∈ S, by intolerance in triangles
one of xa or xb is worse off, preventing this from being an
SIS deviation. Otherwise by weak {2-1}-toxicity, the deviator
from xa and xb needs 3 friends. Either way we conclude x1 ∈ S.
Now at least 1 of x1 and j must be deviating, and thus must
have 3 friends in S. If j is deviating then |S| > 7. If x1 is
deviating, then either its extra friend or j is deviating, bringing
|S|> 7, so that x1 is worse off by weak {3-3}-toxicity.
Now suppose i is a matched deviator. Then by the lemmas,
i must end up in a coalition S ∈ pi′ which includes exactly 1
friend of i. By weak {1-1}-toxicity, S must be a pair, S= {i,k},
say.
We now go through each type i of matched player and show
that i does not deviate into a pair, and is thus not a deviator.
• By triangle-appreciation, xa, xb, xc, xd , and false variable
occurrences are strictly better off than in any pair, so none
of them are deviators.
• True variable occurrences: all preferred players are in
triangles consisting of non-deviators.
• ci players don’t deviate for the same reason as before.
Hence (together with the lemmas above) no matched player
is a deviator.
Now consider a lonely player i. If i deviates, then i ends up
in a coalition S ∈ pi′ consisting of lonely players and possibly
2 players that are in a pair in pi or 3 players in a triangle in
pi (because no matched players are deviators). If S consists
entirely of lonely players, then by 〈〈strict〉〉 {0-1}-toxicity, i
is 〈〈worse off〉〉 not better off, so won’t deviate (SCR: no-one
is strictly better off). Hence S also contains a pair or triangle.
At least 1 of these 2 or 3 players is enemies with i and is thus
worse off by weak {1-1}-toxicity or intolerance in triangles
(since all lonely players are enemies to triangles), so this is
not an SIS-deviation. 〈With 〈〈strict〉〉 {1-1}-toxicity, i is not
better off in S, so not an SNS-deviation 〈〈SSNS-deviation〉〉.〉
Thus we conclude that no player is a deviator. Hence pi is
SIS-stable 〈SNS-stable〉 〈〈SSNS-stable〉〉.
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Stable⇒ Satisfiable.
Suppose pi is a core-stable partition of the game. We show that
ϕ is then satisfiable. The first 3 lemmas are proved exactly as
before.
Lemma 12. The 9 players of a clause cannot all be together
in the same coalition in pi.
Lemma 13. For any given clause, at least 1 of its players
must be together with their literal player in pi.
Lemma 14. No ci can have 3 friends in pi. A ci together with
its literal has at most 1 enemy in pi.
Lemma 15. x1 and x1 cannot both be together with their
clause player.
Proof. Suppose they are. Note that if either x1 or x1 was
together with either of xa or xb (cannot be together with both)
then {xa,xb} blocks. But then by triangle-appreciating and
monotonicity {x1,xa,xb} blocks.
Lemma 16. x1 and x2 cannot both be together with their
clause player.
Proof. Suppose they are. Since the clause players can have
at most 1 enemy, x1 and x2 cannot be in the same coalition in
pi. Also x1 cannot be together with either xa or xb since then
{xa,xb} blocks, and similarly x2 cannot be together with either
xc or xd since then {xc,xd} blocks. Hence {x1,x2} blocks by
consistency on pairs.
Define a propositional assignment A that sets literals that
are in a coalition with their clause player true. By the last
two lemmas, this is well-defined. By the lemma before, each
clause has at least 1 literal that is set true by A. Hence A
satisfies ϕ.
D Class Properties
In this section, we check in more detail that the conditions of
our theorems are satisfied for various classes. All of these are
routine.
Throughout we may assume N 6=∅ and so n> 1, because
all conditions are satisfied vacuously by the empty hedonic
game. It is useful to note that strict {3-1}-toxicity implies
intolerance in triangles, so that we do not need to check this
condition in all cases.
• IRCL
Given N and (>i)i∈N with friend sets (Fi)i∈N , run the
following algorithm producing IRCL lists.
1. List {( j,k) ∈ Fi×Fi : j >i k or j ∼i k and j comes
earlier than k in listing of N}.
2. Sort this list according to ( j,k) ( j′,k′) iff j >i j′
and k >i k′. Break ties arbitrarily.
3. Output this list with entries written as triangles
{i, j,k}, any two entries separated by i.
4. Output Fi ∪{i}, written as pairs {i, j}, with >i re-
placed by i and ∼i replaced by ∼i.
5. End of output.
Clearly this algorithm terminates in polynomial time. The
game described by the output is triangle-appreciating in
all senses, because all friend-triangles come before all
other coalitions. By step 4, the game is consistent on
pairs. Because no coalition including an enemy is listed,
they are not individually rational, so strict {k-1}-toxicity
is satisfied.
• Stable Roommates
This is the game produced by the IRCL-algorithm when
we start it in step 4. So it is consistent on pairs, and strict
{k-1}-toxicity is satisfied.
Neither of the triangle conditions is satisfied.
• W-Games
Consistency on pairs. For agents j,k ∈ Fi∪{i}, by defini-
tionWi({i, j}) = j [for both cases j 6= i and j = i], and
so {i, j}<i {i,k} iffWi({i, j})>iWi({i,k}) iff j >i k.
Strict {k-1}-toxicity. If S includes an enemy e ∈ Ei, then
Wi(S)6i e<i i=Wi({i}), so S≺i {i}.
We do not have triangle-appreciating. We do have mono-
tonicity on triangles, but this is irrelevant.
• WB-Games
The analysis is very similar to the case ofW-games.
• Additively Separable Games
Use J−(n2 +2n),4K-utilities.
Consistency on pairs. {i, j}<i {i,k} iff vi( j)>i vi(k) iff
j >i k.
Strict {k-1}-toxicity. Suppose S contains an enemy e∈ Ei.
Then vi(S)=∑ j∈S vi( j)6 (n−2)×(n+4)−(n2+2n)=
−8< 0, so S≺i {i}.
Triangle-appreciating. If j,k ∈ Fi distinct with j >i k
then vi({i, j,k}) = vi( j)+vi(k)> vi( j) = vi({i, j}) since
vi( j)> 4> 0 in J−(n2 +2n),4K-utilities.
Monotone on triangles. Suppose j, j′,k,k′ ∈ Fi are such
that j>i j′ >i k>i k′. Then vi({i, j,k}) = vi( j)+vi(k)>
vi( j′)+ vi(k′) = vi({i, j′,k′}).
• Hedonic Coalition Nets
We essentially encode the additively separable game withJ−(n2 +2n),4K-utilities from above as a hedonic coali-
tion net. Write Ei = {ei1, . . . ,eik}. Then use the net
j 7−→i vi( j) for friends j ∈ Fi,
ei1∨·· ·∨ eik 7−→i −(n2 +2n)
As noted in the paper, |Fi|6 4 for all i, so the net above
uses at most 5 formulas per agent. We can verify the
properties exactly as we did for the Additively Separable
Game above; toxicity goes through since in our check we
only used the presence of a single enemy.
All weights we used in the net are of size polynomial in
n. Since we always have an explicit list of N as input to
our algorithms, we have n available in unary, so we are
allowed to write the weights in unary.
• Fractional Hedonic Games
Use J−(n2 +5n),7K-utilities.
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Consistent on Pairs. For j,k ∈ Fi∪{i}, {i, j}<i {i,k} iff
vi( j)/2> vi(k)/2 iff j >i k.
Strictly {k-1}-toxic. Suppose S contains an enemy e ∈ Ei.
Then vi(S) = 1/|S|∑ j∈S vi( j) 6 ∑ j∈S vi( j) 6 (n− 2)×
(n+7)− (n2 +5n) =−14< 0.
Triangle appreciating. Let j,k ∈ Fi be distinct with j>i k
and satisfying the closeness condition, which implies
vi( j)−vi(k)6 2. Then vi({i, j,k}) = (vi( j)+vi(k))/3>
(2vi( j)− 2)/3 = 23vi( j)− 23 > vi( j)/2 = vi({i, j}) be-
cause vi( j)> 5 by choice of utilities.
Monotone on triangles. Suppose j, j′,k,k′ ∈ Fi are such
that j >i j′ >i k >i k′. Then vi({i, j,k}) = (vi( j) +
vi(k))/3> (vi( j′)+ vi(k′))/3 = vi({i, j′,k′}).
• Social FHGs.
Use J0,7nK-utilities.
Note that because 7n > 7, all the ‘positive properties’
hold as they did for straight FHGs. We only need to
check the negative properties.
{0-1}-toxic. A coalition S in which i only has enemies
obtains value 0.
Weakly {1-1}-toxic. Let S be {1-1}. Note that then |S|>
3. So vi(S) = 1|S| ∑vi( j)6
1
3 8n<
1
2 7n, where
1
2 7n is the
minimal utility obtained in pairs.
Weakly {2-2}-toxic. Follows from 25 8n< 12 7n.
Weakly {3-3}-toxic. Follows from 37 8n< 12 7n.
Intolerant in triangles. Follows because (a+ b)/3 >
(a+b)/n for all n> 3.
• Median Games.
Use J0,5K-utilities.
{0-1}-toxic. Let S be {0-1}. Then all utilities in S are 0,
so it is evaluated at 0, so {i}<i S.
Weakly {k-k}-toxic. Let S be {k-k}. Then the median
value corresponds to a value or average of vi(i) = 0 or
vi(enemy) = 0, so is 0. On the other hand, in a pair with
a friend, i obtains utility at least 5/2 > 0 by choice of
utilities. Hence {i, j} i S for friends j.
Triangle appreciating. Let j,k ∈ Fi be distinct with j>i k
and satisfying the closeness condition, which implies
vi( j)− vi(k) 6 2. Then vi({i, j,k}) = vi(k) > vi( j)−
2 > vi( j)/2 = vi({i, j}) because vi( j) > 5 by choice of
utilities.
Monotone on triangles. Suppose j, j′,k,k′ ∈ Fi are such
that j >i j′ >i k >i k′. The median value of {i, j,k} is
k, the median value of {i, j′,k′} is k′. Hence {i, j,k} i
{i, j′,k′}.
Intolerance in triangles. Easy to see under the assump-
tion that preferences are strict.
• Midrange.
Use J−3n,1K-utilities.
Consistent on pairs. The midrange of a pair {i, j} is
(depending on some choices) vi( j) or vi( j)/2.
Strict {k-1}-toxicity. Suppose S contains an enemy e∈ Ei.
Then vi(S) = 12B+ 12W = 12B− 12 3n6 12 (n+1−3n) =
−n+ 12 < 0 since n> 1.
• `-Approval.
Assume `> 4, and use J−6`n,4K-utilities.
Consistent on pairs. A pair is valued with the utility of
the partner.
Strictly {k-1}-toxic for k < `. Suppose S is {k-1} with
k< `. Then vi(S) =Y1 + · · ·+Yk+Yk+1 =Y1 + · · ·+Yk−
6`n6 k(n+4)−6`n< `(n+4)−6`n= `(−5n+4)< 0
since `> 0 and n> 1.
The checks of the remaining conditions are identical to
the case of additively separable games, noting that there
we never sum more than the first 3 entries.
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